In search of the NAIRU by David Altig & Paul Gomme
Few ideas arise more frequently in
monetary policy discussions than the
NAIRU, an acronym for the awkward
phrase “nonaccelerating inflation rate
of unemployment.” The NAIRU—or
more precisely, its relationship to the
unemployment rate—is presumed to be
an inflationary bellwether. When the
actual unemployment rate exceeds the
NAIRU, the inflation rate falls; when
the actual rate is below the NAIRU,
inflation rises.
For the past several years, the U.S. un-
employment rate has been lower than
most NAIRU estimates. The 1998
Economic Report of the President, for
example, gave a NAIRU estimate of 
5.5 percent for 1997. The actual rate of
unemployment, however, began the
year at 5.3 percent and fell to 4.6 per-
cent by year’s end. Yet, by almost any
measure, inflation fell throughout 1997
(see table 1). 
This is a perplexing combination of
events because, loosely speaking, the
NAIRU is thought to represent a natural
“speed limit” for economic activity. In
other words, it measures a nation’s sus-
tainable production capacity. When the
economy grows at a rate faster than its
resources can support over the long run
(which presumably occurs when the un-
employment rate falls below the NAIRU
for an extended period), price pressures
build and, eventually, burst through to an
acceleration of the inflation rate.
The NAIRU framework’s apparent fail-
ure to describe the evolution of inflation
over the course of the current expansion
has prompted some brave souls to pro-
claim the dawning of a new economic
era, one in which “speed limits” have
blessedly been revoked forever. Critics
of this view—economist/columnist Paul
Krugman among them—argue that such
a development would be tantamount to
repealing the weather. However, these
critics concede, it is true that sometimes
it rains and sometimes it shines, and a
logical interpretation of the recent dis-
crepancy between “theory” and experi-
ence is that good fortune has given us a
NAIRU that is, in fact, lower than most
estimates imply.
This take on the situation has an air of
plausibility because increased productiv-
ity, made possible by the maturation of
the computer technology revolution, is
one obvious source of our good fortune.1
In essence, favorable technology ad-
vances have lowered the NAIRU, and
the economy has begun operating with a
new speed limit that allows us to enjoy
lower unemployment rates without ignit-
ing a flare-up in inflation.
The only problem with this slant on
events is that it is not obviously correct.
In this Economic Commentary, we dis-
cuss what the modern theory of labor
markets has to say about the effect of
productivity shocks on notions like the
NAIRU. We conclude that if the NAIRU
framework is to survive as a viable tool
for understanding monetary policy, more
than an appeal to accelerated productiv-
ity growth will be needed to salvage it
from its recent failures.2
n n   Inflation, the NAIRU, and the
“Natural” Rate of Unemployment 
What, exactly, is the NAIRU? Strictly
speaking, the definition is statistical, not
theoretical: The NAIRU is the unem-
ployment rate that experience tells us
has, on average, been associated with
stable inflation when matched by the
actual rate of unemployment. 
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quire that there be no gap between
actual unemployment rates and the
NAIRU is not usually made explicit,
which is just to say that the theoretical
foundation of the NAIRU and its role in
determining inflation is often fuzzy.
Furthermore, using formal economic
theory to clarify the relationship re-
quires answering two not-so-easy ques-
tions: What determines the NAIRU?
And how does the unemployment rate
and its relationship to the NAIRU affect
the inflation rate?
We will make no attempt to answer the
second question, but, for the sake of
argument, will take it as given that infla-
tion rate changes result when the unem-
ployment rate deviates from the NAIRU.
Let’s accept provisionally that the infla-
tion rate falls when the unemployment
rate rises above the NAIRU or, more
pertinent to this discussion, when the
NAIRU falls below the existing unem-
ployment rate.
So, the question at hand is, What deter-
mines the NAIRU? To answer this ques-
tion, we will treat the NAIRU as a syn-
onym for the so-called “natural” rate of
unemployment. At this point, you might
think that we have begged the question
by replacing one ill-defined concept
with another, and to some extent you
would be correct. For now, though, let’s
define the natural rate of unemployment
as the level associated with the “normal”
functioning of labor markets. 
But what’s normal? To that question we
turn next.
n n    The Dating Game: 
A Useful Metaphor
To understand labor markets better, we
will take a slight detour and contemplate
the age-old ritual of dating, which, at
first blush, may seem worlds away from
the unemployment question. But, as we
shall see, the dating “market” has impor-
tant parallels to the labor market, paral-
lels that will help us define precisely
what we mean by a normal (or natural)
rate of unemployment.
To start, let’s consider a highly stylized
version of dating—an economic model,
if you will. As with all economic mod-
els, we make certain abstractions to help
isolate the essential characteristics of the
behavior that interests us. The essentials
of our particular dating market are these:
First, the sole objective of dating is to
find an appropriate partner with whom
to enter into a long-term relationship.
Second, dating is a face-to-face
encounter to evaluate “chemistry,” that
is, to determine whether the date would
make a satisfactory partner (what a less
romantically inclined economist might
call assessing the quality of the match).
Finally, dating is expensive because it
takes time. 
Now, let’s consider the behavior of Jane,
who is in the dating market. Like all
other single people in the economy, she
combs the personal ads for prospects
and, on finding a promising one, sets a
date to determine whether she chooses to
enter into a (more or less) permanent
relationship. 
Jane, of course, has certain goals and
expectations. As an illustration, suppose
that she is unwilling to enter into a long-
term relationship with anyone who is 
not at least of, say, Brad Pitt “quality,”
where quality is measured by a bundle 
of attributes such as looks, intelligence,
neatness, sense of humor, and so forth.
In the jargon of economics, we might
refer to Brad Pitt as Jane’s “reservation
partner.” He represents the minimum
quality of person whom Jane finds
acceptable. If her date doesn’t measure
up to Brad Pitt standards, she will refuse
to see him again, and return to the classi-
fieds. However, if her date meets or
exceeds these standards—and she meets
his as well—Jane enters into a relation-
ship and forsakes the dating scene.
The critical aspect of this example is
that, although Jane’s goal is to exit the
dating market, she will only do so if she
finds a suitable match (someone at least
as good as Brad Pitt.) Thus, there will
very likely be some time during which
Jane chooses to be single. 
n n    Search and Equilibrium
Unemployment
With a little imagination, it is easy to see
the similarity between labor markets and
the dating market just described. In par-
ticular, at any given time there will be
unemployed persons who, like Jane, are
forgoing possible long-term relation-
ships in order to seek more desirable
matches. An unemployed computer pro-
grammer, for example, might receive job
offers from plenty of fast-food restau-
rants, but would refuse them because
they do not meet a minimum standard,
which we will summarize by the wage
that is offered.
It is important to recognize that unem-
ployment associated with the process
described here is not necessarily a bad
thing for the economy. It would clearly
be inefficient for a skilled computer pro-
grammer to take an entry-level job in
fast food. However, because information
about potential job characteristics is
imperfect, the search process takes time
to yield the right match, just as Jane
needs time to find the right long-term
partner. And just as Jane will remain a
dating single for a while before living
happily ever after, our programmer will
experience a spell of unemployment
before finding the job that maximizes
the expected fruits of her labor.  
Loosely speaking, then, the natural rate
of unemployment is the level that would
result from the dynamic process of job
creation and destruction, job market
search, and a suitable matching of
employers and employees.
n Dating, Brad Pitt, and the
“Reservation Wage”
In our earlier example, the length of time
that Jane remains single depends partly
on luck. If she’s especially fortunate, she
will quickly “draw” a date from the clas-
sifieds who meets her standards. It is
possible, however, that she will endure a
number of dates that she considers sub-
par before finally hooking up with Brad
Pitt, his equal, or his superior.
But Jane’s dating fortunes are not
entirely beyond her control. She knows
the likelihood of finding a Brad Pitt in
the dating pool, and thus knows the
probability of having a date that does 
not live up to her expectations. Although
the process inevitably contains some
element of chance, Jane can certainly
increase the probability of beginning a
long-term relationship on any given date
if she simply lowers her standards. In
other words, the time that she can expect
to remain single will be reduced if the
“reservation partner” she chooses—the
minimally acceptable long-term mate—
is of lesser quality than Brad Pitt.
So, how does Jane determine that Brad
Pitt is her “reservation partner?” The cal-
culation has two key components: First,
she knows the probability that any given
date will exceed some particular quality
level. Second, she knows the cost of not
accepting a long-term relationship and
continuing to look. Thus, on any particu-
lar date, she knows the likely benefit ofsloughing the fellow off and looking
elsewhere—which is determined by the
probability of finding a higher-quality
man in the future—as well as the costs
of continued search. The reservation
partner, then, is the one for whom the
costs of continued dating just equal the
expected return of continued dating. In
Jane’s case, that person is Brad Pitt.3
The same logic applies to our unem-
ployed computer programmer. Just as
Jane calculates the benefits and costs of
dating, the programmer calculates the
probability of finding a better job than
the one currently offered, and balances
that against the cost of a longer spell of
unemployment. The wage at which the
benefits of continued job search just
equal the costs of further search is called
the reservation wage, which represents
the minimum wage offer for which our
programmer will choose employment
over unemployment.
n n    Do Productivity Increases
Lower the NAIRU?
Now we are in a better position to eval-
uate the claim that significant productiv-
ity gains have lowered the natural rate,
thus driving the NAIRU down below
the actual unemployment rate and yield-
ing the happy environment in which
both the unemployment and inflation
rates fall. As our earlier discussion
makes clear, labor market theory says
that this story can only be true if such
productivity developments fundamen-
tally change the cost-benefit calcula-
tions that unemployed workers use
when searching for jobs.
Will this be the case? Let’s return once
more to our dating metaphor. Suppose
that the quality of all men magically
increases by, say, 10 percent. Would the
number of men Jane would accept as
partners increase, thus reducing the time
she can expect to remain single?
To address this question, it will help if we
make our example a bit more specific.
Suppose that after this wonderful 10 per-
cent improvement, Dexter Pitt (Brad’s
less desirable distant cousin) is of the
same quality as Brad was before the
transformation. Will Jane now be willing
to enter into a relationship with Dexter?
In the absence of other changes, the
answer is no. It’s true that the benefit of
settling for Dexter has risen. But so has
the cost, because Jane loses even more
than before by not holding out for Brad,
whose quality has risen as well. In fact,
it turns out that revisions in costs and
benefits offset one another: Jane’s reser-
vation partner will still be Brad Pitt, and
she will expect to spend exactly the
same amount of time dating (remaining
single) as she did before the pool of men
miraculously improved.
And so it will be with an unemployed
person’s reservation wage. To the extent
that a productivity increase raises all
potential wage offers by the same
amount, say 10 percent, the benefits and
costs of search also rise by 10 percent.
This equivalence occurs because the cost
of continued searching is the opportunity
cost of forgone wage offers. As a conse-
quence, the minimum acceptable wage
offer rises by 10 percent, leaving the
expected spell of unemployment un-
changed by the productivity improve-
ment. Extending this logic to the entire
labor force means, of course, that the
natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU
in the monetary policy context) is invari-
ant—that is, unresponsive—to produc-
tivity increases.
n n    Can Productivity Growth 
Ever Change the NAIRU?
Like all economic parables, this one’s
moral depends on the details. Is it pos-
sible, in any well-constructed world, 
for productivity changes to alter the
NAIRU? Yes, almost certainly, but
getting to this conclusion requires a
fancier story than the usual straight-
forward productivity tale.
One possibility is that workers fail to
perceive how far their productivity has
risen, and hence misjudge the wage that
they can rationally expect to receive. If a
productivity advance, for example,
causes all potential wage offers to rise 10
percent, the logic of our earlier argument
suggests that workers’ reservation wages
should also increase 10 percent. If, how-
ever, job-seekers do not recognize the
full extent of their good fortune, they
may accept jobs at wages below what
they would accept if they were fully
aware of their improved circumstances.
In other words, some people will take
jobs that they should really reject
because, unbeknownst to them, the true
benefit of finding a better job exceeds
their cost of remaining unemployed and
continuing the search.
Thus, temporary confusion about wage
prospects causes the NAIRU (or natural
rate) to fall. The operative word here is
temporary. Once the effects of produc-
tivity developments become known, the
NAIRU will revert to its initial level, as
in the story we developed in the preced-
ing sections.
TABLE 1 VARIOUS MEASURES OF INFLATION
CPI Core CPI
December  Year December Year
to to to to
December Year December Year
1996 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.7
1997 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.4
PPI: Total Finished Goods PPI: Finished Consumer Goods
December  Year December Year
to to to to
December Year December Year
1996 2.8 2.7 3.4 3.6
1997 –1.2 0.4 –1.0 0.7
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, February 1998. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1998.Another possibility is that recent produc-
tivity changes are not of the sort that
raises all wages by 10 percent, but rather
of the sort whose effects vary substan-
tially across the range of jobs. Such a
scenario would very likely change the
NAIRU’s level. However, both theory
and experience are generally silent on
the direction of such a change. 
The moral of this story is that, although
appeals to productivity growth could
conceivably salvage the recent poor per-
formance of NAIRU-based predictions,
salvation from this source seems to
require extremely persistent confusion
on the part of workers or an appeal to
predictions that are difficult to support
by logic or facts. Maybe it can be res-
cued, but maybe—just maybe—it’s
simply time to replace the NAIRU with
a more sophisticated framework for con-
necting the labor market to policy.
n n    Footnotes
1  On the face of it, this view is not strongly
supported by actual productivity numbers,
prompting some of its adherents to claim that
reality is being obscured by technical mea-
surement problems. For a critical assessment
of this argument, see John B. Carlson and
Mark Schweitzer, “Productivity Measures
and the ‘New Economy,’” Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary,
forthcoming.
2. For a fuller development of the ideas in
this Economic Commentary, see Paul
Gomme, “What Labor Market Theory Tells
Us about the ‘New Economy,’” Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic
Review, forthcoming.
3.  In general, Jane’s calculation will involve
the probability that her desire to enter into a
long-term relationship will be reciprocated
by her date. However, we have implicitly as-
sumed that these desires will always be reci-
procated, which probably means that Jane is
herself a pretty good catch.
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